Abilene Christian University

Digital Commons @ ACU
Honors College

ACU Student Research, Theses, Projects, and
Dissertations

5-2017

Marriage Games: A Game Theory Exploration of
Marital Relationships
Barrett R. Corey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.acu.edu/honors
Recommended Citation
Corey, Barrett R., "Marriage Games: A Game Theory Exploration of Marital Relationships" (2017). Honors College. 26.
https://digitalcommons.acu.edu/honors/26

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the ACU Student Research, Theses, Projects, and Dissertations at Digital Commons @ ACU.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors College by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ ACU.

Running Head: MARRIAGE GAMES
Marriage Games: A Game Theory Exploration of Marital Relationships

An Honors College Project Thesis
Presented to
The College of Business Administration
Abilene Christian University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for
Honors Scholar

By
Barrett R. Corey
May 2017

MARRIAGE GAMES

2

Copyright 2017
Barrett R. Corey
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

MARRIAGE GAMES

3

This Project Thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee,
has been accepted by the Honors College of Abilene Christian University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the distinction
HONORS SCHOLAR

_______________________________________________________________
Dr. Jason Morris, Dean of the Honors College

_________________________
Date

MARRIAGE GAMES

4
Advisory Committee

_______________________________________________________________
Dr. Ryan Jessup, Committee Chair

_______________________________________________________________
Dr. Katie Wick, Committee Member

_______________________________________________________________
Dr. Suzie Macaluso, Committee Member

_______________________________________________________________
Dr. Mark Phillips, Department Head

MARRIAGE GAMES

5
Abstract

The prisoners’ dilemma may be one of the most studied games in economic strategy due
to its application to reality and its implications for cooperation. Despite the inherent
alignment between the game and marital relationships, very little research has been
conducted on married partners in a PD game. We wanted to observe the extent to which
behavior in a PD game predicted marital satisfaction. Participants were recruited from a
church couple’s group in Abilene, Texas (n = 40). Results of this preliminary research
indicate that a couple’s competitiveness in the PD game has a positive relationship to
marital satisfaction. The length of an individual’s marriage and how often individuals
cooperate with one another are negatively correlated with an individual’s marital
satisfaction. Results further indicate that a respondent’s likelihood to forgive his partner
for defection had no relationship to their marital satisfaction. We provide some possible
reasons for these divergent findings. This study adds to current research on game theory
and current research on marital satisfaction and relationships, while filling a gap in the
current research on these topics.
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Marriage Games: A Game Theory Exploration of Marital Relationships
Literature Review
Over the past few decades, game theory has gone from a rarely used tool for
economic analysis to one of the most used economic theories. It is inherently
interdisciplinary in nature and has implications for various fields of research. According
to Crawford, “game theory has fulfilled a large part of its promise, giving systematic,
illuminating analyses of many central questions. Indeed, game theory has also begun to
unify the rest of the social sciences, transforming parts of political science, computer
science, and evolutionary biology” (2016). Game theory attempts to explain complex
human interactions with other humans in mathematical terms that can be documented and
analyzed. In Game theory, the goal is to find equilibrium: a point at which all players
(given the information they have) will continue to use the same strategy over and over
without change. The purpose here is to maximize payoffs. There are multiple types of
interactions that game theory explores. There are simultaneous games, where players
both make decisions at the same time and are unaware of what the other player is
choosing. These games explore how people interact with one another with no knowledge
of what decision the other player is choosing. Other games are sequential, where players
must make decisions in order. For example, chess is a sequential game, where one player
makes a move, and the other interacts after seeing what move the first player makes
(Brams et al., 2017).
The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Consider the specific game used in this study: the prisoners’ dilemma (PD).
Creaded by Merril Flood and Melvin Dresher and then further developed by Albert
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Tucker, the prisoners’ dilemma is a simultaneous game that explores how two players
interact with one another (Dixit & Barry, 2017). Each player has two options: defect or
cooperate. An individual’s payoff is determined by the interaction between the two
player’s choices. For example, Table 1a. below shows the payoffs from a hypothetical PD
game matrix. The payoff for player A for any given interaction is on the right and the
payoff for player B is on the left. According to this matrix, if both players choose to
cooperate then they each will receive a score of 11 and if both choose to defect then both
will receive a score of 8. However, if player A cooperates whereas player B chooses to
defect then Player A will receive a score of 0 and player B will receive a score of 20. The
payoffs are reversed if their behaviors are reversed. If player A defects whereas player B
chooses to cooperate then Player A will receive a score of 20 and player B will receive a
score of 0.
Table 1a.

Cooperate

11

11

20

0

Defect

Player B

Player A
Cooperate
Defect

0

20

8

8

It is always a dominate strategy to defect in a single round PD game. This is
because regardless of the other player’s decision, one can always receive a higher payoff
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by choosing to defect rather than cooperate. Consider the payoffs from table 1 again. If
player A cooperates, then player B will receive either a score of 11 (cooperate) or 20
(defect). If player A defects, then player B will receive either a score of 0 (cooperate) or 8
(defect). When both players are acting economically in a single round PD game, both will
choose to defect and both would receive a payoff of 8.
However, when multiple rounds of the game are played, players potentially have a
better option. When both players defect, they each receive a score of 8. However, when
both players decide to cooperate, they could each receive a score of 11. According to
Crawford, when the game is played with multiple rounds, and players are properly
motivated by future payoffs, the decision for both players to cooperate becomes
“consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium. For example, both players could follow
the “grim trigger” strategy “Cooperate until the other player Defects, then Defect
forever,” which happens to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium and yields the outcome
{Cooperate, Cooperate} in every period” (Crawford, 2016). Therefore if the game is
played for an unknown amount of rounds, it is possible that they could cooperate every
round.
However, the decision to either cooperate or defect is not that cut and dry, as
humans are rarely ever purely economical and rational beings. Research has found that
there are many other factors that might affect an individual’s likelihood to cooperate or
defect. Becker et al (2012) found that the big 5 personality traits (extraversion,
agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness and neuroticism) all seem to affect the way a
person decides to act in economic situations where there is a potential payoff. Kagle and
McGee (2014) attempted to predict an individual’s likelihood to cooperate in early
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rounds of a PD game by using these personality traits. They found that agreeableness had
a strong positive relationship towards early round cooperation. This suggest that there are
certain motives other than maximizing payoffs that affect the way people play the PD
game.
Further research indicates that there are some universal factors affecting how
individuals choose to play the PD game. Rather than players fully understanding the most
economical way to approach the PD game from the start, research finds that players
experiment throughout early rounds to determine the best possible strategy (Fudenberg et.
al., 2016). Their results indicate that players rarely held grudges against one another
when the opposing player defected. Rather than punishing the defective player, the
participant would “forgive” the defection, allowing for both players to eventually
cooperate with one another and maximize their payoffs (ibid).
Further research from Fudenberg in 2014 attempted to predict cooperation in a PD
game using various demographic information and a person’s altruistic tendencies.
However, they found that “none of the commonly observed strategies are better explained
by inequity aversion or efficiency concerns than money maximization,” which implies
that in repeated games, cooperation is motivated more by payoffs than various social
factors. Players sought to maximize their payoff above everything else. Cooperation
seems to be directly tied to personal benefit, that is: we seem to be most likely to
cooperate when it benefits us. So while players might be willing to forgive another player
after one or several defections, the authors contend that “leniency and forgiveness seem
to be motivated by strategic concerns rather than social preferences” (2014).
Marriage and the Game
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Previous research seems to focus completely on how two strangers decide to play
the PD game, and the research suggests that strangers focus on individual payoffs and
disregard how their decision might affect the opposing person. However, the same might
not be true for individuals who live in close social context with one another. These types
of players will have much more intimate knowledge of one another, which might affect
how they play.
The bond of marriage might be one of most intimate types of social contexts
apparent today. Research shows that couples must make intimate and difficult decisions
daily. These decisions can determine whether their marriage will be successful or not
(Lavner, et. al, 2014). Essentially, couples must decide daily how they are going to
interact with one another. Much like the prisoners’ dilemma, in marriages, couples
choose to either defect, or cooperate with one another. Kalifian and Barry further find
that couples learn how to navigate marital problems, and the inability to successfully
cope and address these issues results in marital stress and potential marital transgressions
(2016).
It seems as though the way a couple interacts in the PD game might map well
onto how the interact with one another throughout marriage. For example, a spouse
decides whether or not they will assist with chores around the house (cleaning, washing
dishes, food preparation, etc.) and choosing to not cooperate with their spouse on these
issues could easily be seen as defection by their spouse. Despite this inherent alignment
between the game and marital relationships, very little research has been conducted on
married partners in a PD game.
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It seems that one’s marital satisfaction could be predicted by their interactions
with their spouse in a PD game. Married couples who play the PD game can either
choose to work together to maximize their collective payoff, or they could choose to
defect and attempt to maximize their own payoff. Based on the previous research
discussed, it seems that couples with high rates of defection would be less satisfied with
their marriage.
Research Question
This research attempts to predict a person’s martial satisfaction based on the
interactions with their spouse in the PD game. Previous research indicated that age,
gender, and education all can be used to predict marital satisfaction. Specifically, Jose
and Alfons found that “Men tend to show higher levels of marital satisfaction compared
with women,” and that “highly educated women had higher rates of unstable marriages”
(Jose & Alfons 2007). Even when controlling for these demographics, we hoped to see an
effect on marital satisfaction from the PD game.
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Methodology

Participants were recruited from a local church group in Abilene, Texas (n=40).
This specific church group was designed for couples who wished to improve their
marriage, and as much, a majority of our participants had expressed difficulties in their
marriage. Data was collected over the course of several Wednesdays between the dates of
January 18, 2017 and March 22, 2017. On any given week of data collection there would
be 4 to 12 participants.
First, participants took a marital satisfaction survey using 30 questions from the
Couples Satistfaction Index (Funk & Rogge, 2007). They then provided additional
demographic information such as gender, ethnicity, and length of marriage. Questions
were on a scale from 1 to 6 and we used their average score as their individual marital
satisfaction score. Question’s addressed issues regarding relationship strength, desire to
continue in the relationship and how well a person’s needs were met by their spouse. See
appendix 1 for the complete survey.
Self-report tests are, at best, noisy estimates of some true, underlying variable. To
the extent that they are reliable estimates of an underlying variable, in this case, marital
satisfaction, it is possible that a principal components analysis could help elucidate the
signal from the noise. We ran a principle components analysis on individual’s responses
to the survey. The first principle component explained approximately 65% of the
variance in the dataset. We used this first principle component as their marital satisfaction
score- the dependent variable in our analysis.
Second, individuals participated in a minimum of 20 rounds of the prisoners’
dilemma game against their spouse. We used z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox, a computer
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software program to run the PD game (Fischbacher, 2007). Individuals were given an
instruction sheet and had these instructions read to them before the game occurred. See
appendix 2 for the complete instruction sheet. Due to constraints in location, couples
played the game in the same room as one another, but on different sides of the room so
that they were unable to see each other’s computer screen. Payoffs per round are
described in table 1b. below. Individuals received a payoff for participating in this study
in the form of a restaurant gift card based on their preferences indicated on the survey.
We used a random round from the PD game to determine the amount of money received
on the gift card. For example, if the random round chosen was round 5, and a player
recievd a score of 11 on round 5, their payoff would be an $11 gift card. In this way,
individuals were encouraged to maximize their payoff on every round.
Table 1b.

Cooperate

11

11

20

0

Defect

Player B

Player A
Cooperate
Defect

0

20

8

8

We added a 1/8th probability of “error,” in our PD game, following similar
methods as Fudenberg, Rand and Dreber in their 2012 study. For example, on any given
round one, or both player’s choice to either cooperate or defect could be changed to the
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opposite decision, at a probability of 1/8. If an “error” occurred, neither the one who sent
it nor the one who received it would be aware that this was not the intended play. The
player who sent the error would receive the payout as if their actual decision was made,
whereas the individual who received the error would receive the payout in accordance to
the error. This “communication error” properly mimics actual marital interactions, where
an individual is not always completely aware of his or her spouse’s true intentions.
After the 20th round of the PD game, the game had a 20% chance of another round
occurring in keeping with Fudenberg et. al. (2012). Crawford suggests that when the PD
game is played for a specific and known number of rounds, “that players’ preferences are
defined by the addition of players’ payoffs across plays of the game… The unique
equilibrium then entails both players choosing Defect in every period” (Crawford, 2016).
In other words, it would be in both player’s best self-interest to defect every round if
there is a specified number of rounds.
By creating a modified PD game with both error and a chance of continuance
after round 20, we can properly “test what happens when subjects play an infinitely
repeated prisoners’ dilemma with error” (Fudenberg, 2012). This method is reliable to
both reduce the chance that an individual will keep to one strategy throughout the game,
and properly mimics the reality of married life- where length of time is not predetermined
and knowledge is not absolute.
We trimmed the first 5 responses of the PD game off the dataset in order to reduce
the noise from individuals learning how to properly play the game in early rounds
(Fudengberg, 2012). For each respondent, we had a minimum of 15 rounds of decision
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making in the PD game, along with the decisions made by their spouse, the interaction
between those decisions, and their specific demographic information.
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Results

Demographics
As previously stated, there was a total of 40 participants. Each respondent
provided their ethnicity, age, gender, years married and education level. Due to our
location in Abilene, Texas the overwhelming majority of respondents reported their
ethnicity as White (n= 37). Because of this, ethnicity was excluded from the analysis.
Age
Table 2 shows the breakdown of participants by age. All of the respondents fell
between the age 21 and 65, with the all but 7 respondents falling under the age of 40. To
determine the effect of age on a person’s marital satisfaction score, we divided our
respondents into three age bins: 21 to 30, 31 to 36, and 37 to 65 (See Table 2 below for
details). Chart 1 depicts the average marital satisfaction score of each age bin. Those in
the age group 31 to 36 had the highest marital satisfaction with an average score of 5.31
and those youngest and oldest categories had the lowest marital satisfaction scores with
4.35 and 4.22 respectfully. Of particular interest was whether age was related to a
person’s marital satisfaction. We tested this by running a single factor ANOVA
comparing a person’s marital satisfaction score to their age bin, the results of which was
significant. A post hoc analysis shows that there is a statistically significant difference in
the average score between those in the age category 31 to 36 and the rest of the
respondents (p =.0093).
Table 2
Age Bins
21-30
31-36
37-65

Avg. Score
4.34579
5.30519
4.22073

N
14
12
14
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Chart 1

Average Marital Satisfaction by Age
6.00
5.00
4.00

5.31
4.35

4.22

3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
21 to 30 Years Old

31 to 36 Years Old

37 to 65 Years Old

We then tested to see if a person’s age had any effect on their probability of
cooperating in the PD game. A person’s probability of cooperation is defined as their
average rate of cooperation over all rounds of the PD game. Chart 2 shows each person’s
probability of cooperating with their spouse on any given round. As respondents age
increased, their rate of defection rose and thus older individuals had a lower probability
of cooperation. In order to determine if there is a relationship between a person’s age and
their probability of cooperation, we ran a single factor ANOVA comparing a person’s
probability of cooperation to their age bin, the results of which were insignificant (p =
.15). We saw no relationship between a person’s age and their probability of cooperation
in the PD game.
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Chart 2

Average Probability of Cooperation by
Age
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.60
0.40
0.38

0.20

0.45

0.00
21 to 30 Years Old

31 to 36 Years Old

37 to 65 Years Old

Gender
We tested to see if gender had any effect on marital satisfaction or a person’s
probability of cooperation. Chart 3 shows that on a scale from 1 to 6, men had slightly
higher reported marital satisfaction scores. Chart 4 shows that there was almost no
difference between men and women’s likelihood to cooperate with one another. We
wished to see if there was a relationship between a person’s gender and either their
marital satisfaction or their probability of cooperation. To test this, we ran two 1-tailed ttests assuming unequal variance comparing gender to these variables and the results of
both were insignificant (p = .15, .35). We found that gender had no effect on either
marital satisfaction or probability of cooperation.
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Chart 3

Chart 4

Average Marital Satisfaction
by Gender
6.00
4.00

4.78

1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00

4.43

2.00
0.00
Male

Average Probability of
Cooperation by Gender

Female

0.49

0.47

Male

Female

Years married
We binned respondent’s number of years married into three categories as depicted
in Table 3. Twenty-seven participants had been married less than nine years. Charts 5 and
6 show that those who had been married longer reported lower marital satisfaction scores
while also reporting lower levels of cooperation. We wished to see if length of marriage
was related to a person’s marital satisfaction score or their probability of cooperation. To
test this, we ran two single factor ANOVAs comparing a person’s length of marriage bin
to their marital satisfaction score and their probability of cooperation, the results of which
were insignificant (p = .642, .698). We saw no relationship between a respondent’s
number of years married and either their marital satisfaction or their probability of
cooperation.
Table 3
Years Married Bins Average Score
1 to 4
4.796
5 to 9
4.510
9 or More
4.447

N
14
13
13
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Chart 5

Chart 6

Average Marital Satisfaction
per Years Married
4.90
4.80
4.70
4.60
4.50
4.40
4.30
4.20

Probability of Cooperation per
Years Married
0.55

4.80

0.50
4.51

4.45

0.53

0.52

0.45
0.44
0.40

1 to 4

5 to 8

9 or more

1 to 4

5 to 8

9 or more

Education Level
Respondents reported their education level by six different categories: less that
high school, high school equivalency, some college but no degree, associate’s degree,
bachelor’s degree, and graduate or professional degree. We combined these six categories
into three distinct categories: those with a high school education or less, those with some
college, and those with a bachelor’s degree or higher. See table 4 for more details.
Table 4
Education Bins
High School or Less
Some Colelge
Bachelors or More

N
7
14
19

Marital Satisfaction
4.905
4.223
4.744

Chart 6 and 7 show that those with a mid-range education level report the lowest marital
satisfaction while also having the highest level of cooperation. Of particular interest was
if there was a relationship between a person’s education level and either their marital
satisfaction or their probability of cooperation. To test this, we ran two single factor
ANOVAs comparing respondent’s education level bin to both their marital satisfaction
score and their probability of cooperating, the results of which were insignificant (p =
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.231, .621). We saw no relationship between a respondent’s level of education and either
their marital satisfaction or their probability of cooperation.
Chart 6

Average Marital Satisfaction by Education Level
6.00
5.00
4.91

4.00

4.74
4.22

3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
Less than high school - High
school graduate or high school
graduate equivalency

Some college, no degree Associate's degree

Bachelor's degree - Graduate or
professional degree

Chart 7

Probability of Cooperation by Education Level
100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

54.97%
42.17%

Less than high school - High
school graduate or high school
graduate equivalency

Some college, no degree Associate's degree

47.74%

Bachelor's degree - Graduate
or professional degree

Multiple Linear Regression (MLR)
The goal of this research is to see if any factors from the PD game could be used
to predict a person’s marital satisfaction score. We first ran a best subset multiple linear
regression (MLR) using nine different variables. This method of MLR finds the best
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combination of some or all of the independent variables to predict the dependent variable.
The dependent variable we used was the first principle component of each person’s
answers to the survey.
Several of our independent variables had to be modified before we could use them
in the MLR analysis. MLR assumes that the relationship between the independent
variable and the dependent variable is linear. However, several of our independent
variables had non-linear relationship to marital satisfaction. In order to mitigate this, we
used the logarithm of both years married and age, as these two variables seemed to have a
non-linear relationship to marital satisfaction. We used both a person’s self-reported
education level (on a scale from 1 to 6) and their education level squared, as this variable
too had a non-linear relationship to a participant’s marital satisfaction- in a seemingly
bell-curve shape. Gender was also included in this original model.
We included 4 variables from the PD game. We chose a person’ probability to
cooperate, their partner’s probability to cooperate, an interaction variable between these
two probabilities, and a person’s relative level of cooperation given their partner defected
on the last round. This final variable – relative level of cooperation given their partner
defected last round- is a forgiveness variable. It measures how likely an individual is to
forgive their spouse for not cooperating the round before. By trimming the first 5 rounds
of the PD game (see Methods for details) we ensured that we were seeing genuine
forgiveness rather that participants learning how to play the game in early rounds. In our
model, we expected to see that these variables from the PD game would have a positive
relationship to marital satisfaction.
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The MLR best-subset produced a four-variable model, with each variable having
statistical significance. Using this model, a person’s marital satisfaction can be described
using the following formula:
PCA(Marital Satisfaction) = -3.56 -.96(YearsMarried) + 2.22(Education) .26(Education^2) -1.69(InteractionProbability)
A persons’ number of years married had a negative relationship to their marital
satisfaction (p = .05). High levels of education had a positive relationship to marital
satisfaction (p = .018). However, after a point, a very high level of education begins to
have a negative relationship to marital satisfaction as seen in the negative coefficient of
education squared (p= .035).

Only one variable from the PD game appeared in this best-subset model: the
interaction variable between a couple’s probability of cooperation (p= .035).
Contradictory to what we expected, a couple’s group cooperation actually lowered their
marital satisfaction. Also surprising, a person’s likelihood to forgive their spouse for
defection was not in the model, as it was a poor predictor of marital satisfaction.
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Discussion & Recommendations

Due to the obvious limitations of a small sample size and similar demographic
information of all respondents, this research is not generalizable to either Abilene, or
married couples in general. Rather, this research is intended to provide preliminary
information about how the PD game can be used to predict marital satisfaction.
Results from the MLR model seem to contradict the current research on how
people play the PD game. The fact that the participants were recruited from a marital selfhelp group might explain this. For example, a couple that is recent married might desire
to attend such a group even if they report high marital satisfaction whereas a couples that
has been married for many years might only attend such a group if they are experiencing
major problems in their marriage.
We found that there was no relationship between a person’s likelihood to forgive
their spouse for defection and marital satisfaction. Perhaps individuals who are quick to
forgive their spouse, while likely to be happy at first, end up facing a more defective
partner in the long run. If a person is not “punished” for defection, they could be more
likely to continue to defect. This result seems to agree with the research of McNulty and
Fincham who contend that “forgiveness may not always be so beneficial…Rather,
forgiveness is a process that can be either beneficial or harmful, depending on
characteristics of the relationship in which it occurs (McNulty & Fincham, 2012).
Perhaps most interesting is that the interaction between a couple’s probability of
cooperation actually predicted lower levels of marital satisfaction. We suggest that this
has to do with playfulness. In other words, couples that have no competitiveness between
one another, and therefore cooperate continuously, do not feel the same kind of passion
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and joy in their relationship as couple’s that compete with one another do. In research
from Driver and Gottman they found that a couple’s playfulness was correlated to their
ability to resolve conflict. Specifically, they found “that the husband’s playful bids in
daily life seem to have an important role for both conflict and everyday interactions. His
ability to initiate playfulness was strongly related to both the wife’s playfulness and her
own enthusiasm. His playfulness was also related to the couple’s ability to access humor
during conflict” (2004). It therefore makes sense that couples who are able to play well
against one another would have a higher marital satisfaction.
Another point of interest is the apparent decline in marital satisfaction for those
who have been married for over nine years and are over 37 years of age. We believe that
this might have something to do with children. Previous research posits that children can
have a major effect on individual happiness, particularly in the mother (Taraban et. al.
2017). Those who have been married over nine years and in this age bracket are at an age
where, if they have children, their children are beginning to start school, which could be
stress inducing for the family. Future research should examine the role of children in
marital satisfaction.
As we move forward in this study, we hope to have a larger and more diverse
sample size, as this was our greatest limitation. However, as preliminary research to a
much larger project, this research proves to be extremely beneficial. We see that there
seems to be some relationship between how couples interact in the PD game and their
self-reported marital satisfaction. Currently, game theory has not been used to map
marital satisfaction, but could perhaps be a helpful tool for couples, therapists and social
scientists in future research.
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Appendix

Wick et al. Marriage Survey: (data was collected through online survey format through Google Drive)
Taken from Funk, J. L. & Rogge, R. D. (2007). Testing the ruler with item response theory:
Increasing precision of measurement for relationship satisfaction with the Couples Satisfaction
Index. Journal of Family Psychology, 21, 572-583.

Questions about your marriage relationship:
1. Please indicate the degree of happiness, all things considered, of your
relationship.
Extremely
Fairly
A Little Happy Very Extremely Perfect
Unhappy Unhappy Unhappy
Happy
Happy

Most people have disagreements in their relationships. Please indicate below the
approximate extent of agreement or disagreement between you and your partner for each
item on the following list.
Always Almost Occasionally Frequently Almost
Always
Disagree
Agree Always
Disagree
Always Disagree
Agree
Disagree
2. Amount of
time spent
together
3. Making major
decisions
4.
Demonstrations
of affection
All
the
Time
5. In general, how
often do you
think that things
between you and
your partner are going
well?
6. How often do you
wish you
hadn’t gotten into this

Most
of
the
Time

More
Often
than Not

Occasionally Rarely Never
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relationship?
Not at
all
True
7. I still feel a strong
connection
with my partner
8. If I had my life to live
over, I
would marry (or live
with/date) the same
person
9. Our relationship is
strong
10. I sometimes wonder
if there is someone else
out there for me
11. My relationship with
my
partner makes me happy
12. I have a warm and
comfortable relationship
with my partner
13. I can’t imagine
ending my
relationship with my
partner
14. I feel that I can
confide in my
partner about virtually
anything
15. I have had second
thoughts
about this relationship
recently
16. For me, my partner is
the
perfect romantic partner
17. I really feel like part
of a team with my
partner
18. I cannot imagine
another
person making me as
happy as my partner does

A
little
True

Somewhat

True

Mostly
True

Almost
Completely

True

Completely

True

MARRIAGE GAMES

32

Not at
All

A
Little

Somewhat

Mostly

Almost

Completely

completely

19. How rewarding is
your
relationship with your
partner?
20. How well does your
partner
meet your needs?
22. In general, how
satisfied are
you with your
relationship?
Worse than
all
others
(extremely
bad)

Better than all
others
(extremelygood)

23. How good is your
relationship compared to
most?
Never

Less
than
once a
month

Once
or
twice a
month

Once
or
twice
a
week

Once a
day

More
Often

24. Do you enjoy your
partner’s
company?
25. How often do you
and your
partner have fun
together?
For each of the following items, select the answer that best describes how you feel about
your relationship. Base your responses on your first impressions and immediate feelings
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about the item.

Additional Questions not from Funk and Rogge (2007):
33. How many years have you been married? (Please round to the nearest whole number.)
____________
Strongly Somewhat
Disagree Disagree

Neither
Agree or
Disagree

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly
Agree

34. We have
experienced major
problems in our
marriage.
If you agree that you have experienced major problems in your marriage, please indicate which
of the following you have experienced (check all that apply):
__ Separation
__ Death of a child
__ Financial problems
__ Health problems
__ Children with special needs
__ Marital infidelity
__ Pornography
__ Other: _________________________________

Demographic Information:
Gender:

Male

Age:
Age of spouse:

Female
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White

Hispanic or Latino

Black or African American

(select one)

Native American or American Indian Asian / Pacific Islander
Other
Education: What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
___ Less than high school
___ High school graduate (includes equivalency)
___ Some college, no degree
___ Associate's degree
___ Bachelor's degree
___ Graduate or professional degree
Restaurant Preferences:
On a scale of -5 (greatly dislike) to 5 (greatly enjoy), please rate your preference for the
following restaurants –
-5
Jason’s Deli
Buffalo Wild Wings
Hickory Street Cafe

Golden Corral

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5
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Appendix 2- Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Instructions (page 1/2)

Instructions:
Thank you for participating in this experiment!
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to
ask us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed during the experiment.
This experiment is about decision making. You will be matched with your spouse in another
room. You will be able to earn a restaurant gift card (to be delivered next week) based on
your preferences and the decisions you and your spouse make in the experiment.
The Session:
The session is divided into a series of interactions between you and your spouse in the other
room.
In each interaction, you play a random number of rounds. In each round, you and your spouse
can choose one of two options.
In each round of the experiment, the same two possible options are available to both of you:
A or B.
Your round-total income for each possible action by you and the other player is described in
the table below. Your payoff is listed first and is in bold and your spouse’s payoff is listed
second.
Your Spouse’s Choice
A
B
11, 11
0, 20
20, 0
8, 8

Your Choice A
B
For example:
If you play A and the other person plays A, you would both get 11 units.
If you play A and the other person plays B, you would get 0 units, and they would get 20
units.
If you play B and the other person plays A, you would get 20 units, and they would get 0
units.
If you play B and the other person plays B, you would both get 8 units.
Your income for each round will be calculated and presented to you on your computer
screen.
You must enter your choice within 30 seconds or a random choice will be made for you.
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Appendix 2- Modified Prisoners’ Dilemma Game Instructions (page 2/2)
A chance that your choice is flipped:
There is a large probability that the move you choose actually occurs. But with a small
probability, your move will be flipped to the opposite of what you chose. That is:



When you choose A, there is a large chance that you will actually play A, and small
chance that instead you play B. The same is true for the other player.
When you choose B, there is a large chance that you will actually play B, and small
chance that instead you play A. The same is true for the other player.

When a choice flip or error occurs, the person sending the error will not know that their
choice has been switched. For example, if the wife chooses A and with the small probability
it is flipped to B, her husband will receive the payoff as if she chose B but she will receive
the payoff associated with her true choice of A. The husband will not be informed that B was
not her original choice.
Number of Rounds:
You will play at least 20 rounds of this decision experiment with your spouse. After the 20
round, there is an 80% probability of another round, and 20% probability that the interaction
will end. Successive rounds will occur with probability 80% each time, until the interaction
ends (with probability 20% after each round).
th

Summary
To summarize, every interaction you have with your spouse in the experiment includes 20
rounds with a random number of rounds added thereafter. Your behavior has no effect on the
number of rounds or the number of interactions.
There is a small probability that the option (A or B) you choose will be flipped and the
opposite option occurs instead, and the same is true for your spouse. If your choice is
switched, you will not know and your payoff will not be affected. If your choice is switched,
your spouse will be told which move actually occurred, but they will not know what move
you actually chose.

